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Correspondence: The Stuff of 
Constitutional Law 
Neal E. Devins* 
Are decisions of the United States Supreme Court "the 'stuff of 
constitutionallaw?"1 Authors of constitutional law case books seem to think 
so. Their books, in the words of Henry Monaghan, are organized around 
the "widely held and deep belief' that the study of constitutional law should 
be undertaken "through a detailed examination of Supreme Court deci-
sions, albeit supplemented in varying degrees by authors' questions and law 
review excerpts."2 Monaghan's observation is fifteen years old, but the 
conformity in constitutional law texts persists. This placidity is rooted in the 
most basic premise of constitutional law instruction: "The Court is the 
ultimate arbiter of the Constitution."3 As a result, constitutional truth 
derives solely from the examination of Supreme Court opinions. 
It is also true that the traditional case and academic commentary 
model, while hardly shaken, is now under fire. A spate of supplemental 
works in constitutional history, theory, and politics, designed to fill gaps in 
the traditional casebook, have been published in the past few years.4 Several 
recent articles have also attacked the traditional model as incomplete and 
dangerous.5 One of these attacks, Professors Thomas Baker and James 
Viator's Not Another Constitutional Law Course: A Proposal to Teach a Course on 
the Constitution, 6 recently appeared on the pages of this journal. 
Baker and Viator's piece is part complaint and part solution. The 
complaint is that the teaching of constitutional law focuses too much on the 
*Associate Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary; A.B. 
Georgetown, 1978; J.D. Vanderbilt, 1982. Thanks to Erwin Chemerinsky, Lou Fisher, Barry 
Friedman, John Garvey, Mike Gerhardt, and Jarrell Wright for commenting on an earlier 
draft of this correspondence. All errors are my own. 
1. Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Law Casebooks: A View from the Podium, 79 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1020, 1021 (1981). 
2. Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1977) (reviewing Paul 
Brest, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials (1975)). 
3. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
4. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, A History of the American Constitution 
(1990); Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law (1992);John H. 
Garvey & T. Alexander Alienikoff, Modern Constitutional Theory: A Reader (2d ed. 1989); 
John H. Garvey & Frederick F. Schauer, The First Amendment: A Reader (1992); Michael]. 
Gerhardt & Thomas D. Rowe, Constitutional Theory: Arguments and Perspectives (1992); H. 
Jefferson Powell, Languages of Power: A Sourcebook of Early American Constitutional 
History (1991). 
5. See Thomas E. Baker & James E. Viator, Not Another Constitutional lAw Course: A 
Proposal to Teach a Course on the CtmStitution, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 739 (1991); Louis Fisher, The 
Curious Belief in judicial Supremacy, 25 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 85 (1991); W. Michael Reisman, 
International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International Law, 10 
Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 8 n.13 (1984); Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Constitutional Education, 1987 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1023 (1987). 
6. Baker & Viator, supra note 5. 
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reading of cases and too little on to the reading of historical materials that 
shed light on the framers' intentions.7 For Baker and Viator, "[t]o surren-
der to this tendency and begin in 1803" with Marbury v. Madison is to ignore 
John Marshall's most important admonition "that 'we must never forget 
that it is a constitution we are expounding."'8 Their solution, however, is not 
to restructure the constitutional law course. Instead, Baker and Viator 
propose a set of lesson plans for a "three hour elective" in constitutional 
history.9 
Baker and Viator's premise is that constitutional interpretation should 
not be confined to Supreme Court decisions and related commentary by 
legal academics. In many respects, it parallels former Attorney General 
Edwin Meese III's contention "that '[h]owever the Court may interpret the 
provisions of the Constitution, it is still the Constitution which is the law and 
not the decision of the Court."'10 Meese's distinction between the Consti-
tution and constitutional law caused a firestorm by openly challenging the 
most basic premise of constitutional instruction. 11 Baker and Viator launch 
an identical challenge. They claim that, by failing to treat the framers' 
intentions as the first building blocks of constitutional law, the course is 
"upside-down, pedagogically as well as chronologically."I2 
Baker and Viator correctly criticize constitutional law casebooks. 
Constitutional decisionmaking cannot be traced solely to the efforts of nine 
Justices working in isolation. Other parts of government regularly interpret 
the Constitution and influence the judiciary. The fundamental role played 
by the elected branches in shaping constitutional values, however, is given 
little recognition in constitutional law texts. 13 Constitutional decisionmak-
ing is also influenced by history, empirical study, policy analysis and 
editorial commentary. These sources help shape constitutional debate both 
7. Id. at 740 ("while reading cases is necessary, it is not enough."). 
8. Id. at 742 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819)). David 
Bryden and former Assistant Attorney General Wm. Bradford Reynolds, on separate 
occasions, have also emphasized that the constitutional law course should take "our constitu-
tional heritage" into account. David P. Bryden, Teaching Constitutional Law: Homage to Clio, 
1 Canst. Commentary 131, 131 (1984); Reynolds, supra note 5, at 1030-31. 
9. Baker & Viator, supra note 5, at 746, 747-61. At the same time, Baker and Viator 
indicate that Jaw schools should make mandatory a course in constitutional history. Id. at 742. 
10. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979, 983 (1987) 
(quoting 3 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 470-71 (1923)). 
11. Laurence Tribe warned that Meese's position "represents a grave threat to the rule of 
Jaw ••. ," Stuart Taylor, Jr., Liberties Union Denounces Meese, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1986, at 
A17. Michael Kinsley called Meese's speech a ·~urisprudential stink bomb." Michael Kinsley, 
Meese's Stink Bomb, Wash. Post, October 29, 1986, at A19. Anthony Lewis said Meese's 
position was an invitation to anarchy. Anthony Lewis, Law or Power?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 
1986, at A23. 
12. Baker & Viator, supra note 5, at 742. 
13. Leading constitutional texts make occasional reference to political events surrounding 
landmark Court decisions. These references, however, are sporadic at best. Moreover, none of 
the leading constitutional texts make use of "notes and questions" materials to prod law 
students to think about the role of elected government in the shaping of constitutional values. 
One notable exception-although its principal audience is political science students-is Louis 
Fisher's American Constitutional Law. See generally Louis Fisher, American Constitutional Law 
(1990). 
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inside and outside the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, constitutional law 
texts omit virtually any reference to outside materials not written by legal 
academics.14 
Baker and Viator are on solid ground in condemning existing case-
books for giving "short shrift to the political and intellectual history of the 
framers and their document."15 Their criticism, however, is too limited in 
scope. The constitutional law course is in need of much more than a shot of 
constitutional history. Likewise, a three hour <:aRstitutional history elective 
will do little to remedy pervasive problems in the required constitutional 
law course. The solution to the inadequacies of the constitutional law course 
is not the creation of specialized electives. The solution is to change the 
constitutional law course itself. 
Such changes cannot occur unless casebook authors extend the 
traditional case and academic commentary model to include substantial 
excerpts from constitutional politics, empirical studies, policy analyses, and 
editorial commentary.16 This extension will make teaching materials more 
accurate, more useful, and more interesting. 
MORE ACCURATE. Most landmark Supreme Court decisions cannot be 
understood without paying attention to the politics surrounding them. 17 
First, Justices pay attention to politics in crafting their decisions. John 
Marshall's sequencing of merits and jurisdiction in Marbury v. Madison and 
Earl Warren's efforts at crafting a unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of 
Education were both preemptive strikes designed to limit the political 
14. Casebooks, of course, contain some references to the works of individuals in related 
disciplines. These references, however, are the exception and not the rule. My observation, 
moreover, should not be construed to suggest that nonlegal policy analysis and commentary 
is somehow superior to the work of legal academics. My point is simply that casebooks 
undervalue important and pertinent work not written by legal academics. 
15. Baker & Viator, supra note 5, at 741. 
16. The inclusion of material detailing the framers' intent on an issue before the Coun 
would also be of value. Contrary to Baker and Viator's suggestion, such material should not 
become the focal point of the constitutional law course. First, there is reason to doubt that the 
framers' themselves perceived that their intentions should govern constitutional decisionmak-
ing. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 
885,903-04 (1985). Cf. Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent the View of the Framers', and the 
Role of the Ratifiers, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 507, 516 (1988) ("history does not suppon the position 
... that the framers and ratifiers did not intend the judiciary to look at original intent.") 
Second, the framers' intent on a particular issue is typically opaque or nonexistent. See Paul 
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204 (1980). 
Cf Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: 
Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226, 252 {1988) ("The very breadth of this 
claim makes it implausible. It is essentially an attack on the possibility and validity of historical 
investigation."). Third, constitutional decisionmakers infrequently rely on the framers' intent. 
Consequently, irrespective of the accuracy or propriety of such analysis, law students would be 
poorly served by a constitutional law course that discounts the ways constitutional decision-
makers actually resolve constitutional disputes. 
17. Lou Fisher and I have written a ·collection of twenty-two studies of the politics 
surrounding landmark Coun decisions. See generally Fisher & Devins, supra note 4. The cases 
referred to in this Correspondence, for the most pan, come from that collection. Conse-
quently, rather than clutter this Correspondence with detailed footnote suppon, I have chosen 
to simply refer to those case studies. 
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repercussions of unpopular decisions.18 Second, politics is informative in 
assessing Supreme Court doctrine. Legislation limiting the impact of Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority speaks to whether, as the Court 
held in Garcia, states' rights concerns are adequately represented in 
Congress. 19 Analysis of the decision to defer to military decisionmaking in 
Korematsu v. United States should take into account that the internment of 
Japanese-Americans was a subterfuge perpetuated by the military and 
approved by the Justice Department.2° Third, political judgments shape 
Court doctrine. Congress' choice to ground the public accommodations 
section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in the Commerce Clause as well as the 
Fourteenth Amendment allowed the Court to treat Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States and Katzenbach v. McClung as commerce cases.21 Likewise, 
amendments to the 1987 Ethics in Government Act proved critical to 
Morrison v. Olson by expanding Justice Department authority in indepen-
dent counsel investigations.22 Fourth, politics contributes to the ultimate 
meaning of Court action. The institutional dynamics that made the 
legislative veto so popular before l.N.S. v. Chadha explain why the device 
continues to be used, with well over two hundred legislative vetoes put into 
place in the past decade.23 The limits of Brown Irs delegation of remedial 
authority to Southern district court judges are underscored by mid-sixties 
elected branch action which resulted in more desegregation in 1965 than in 
the decade following Brown.24 And, fifth, once the Supreme Court has 
decided a case, a "constitutional dialogue" takes place between the Court 
and elected government, often resulting in a decision more to the liking of 
political actors. Congress ultimately persevered in challenging the Court's 
1918 rejection of the Commerce Clause as the basis for child labor 
legislation.25 Executive and legislative action to express disapproval of Roe 
v. Wade through funding restrictions were approved by the' Court in both 
Harris v. McRae and Rust v. Sullivan.26 
Congress, the White House, government agencies, and the states all 
play critical interdependent roles in ,interpreting Supreme Cour~ decisions 
and the Constitution itself. The sweep and influence of these interpreta-
tions are broad and pervasive.27 By giving short shrift to these interpreta-
tions, as well as to the interactions between elected government and the 
courts, constitutional law texts omit information critical to an understand-
18. Fisher & Devins, supra note 4, at 27-38 (Marbury); 261-83 (Brown). 
19. Id. at 107-20. 
20. Id. at 245-61. 
21. Id. at 98-107. 
22. Id. at 142-60. 
23. Id. at 141-42. 
24. Id. at 261-83. 
25. Id. at 78-85. 
26. Id. at 212-32. 
27. Constitutional decisionmaking is not simply politics. Politicians and judges are often 
governed by principles of decisionmaking as well as stare decisis. See Michael]. Gerhardt, The 
Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 68 
(1991). My contention is simply that political actors play a significant role in shaping 
constitutional values. 
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ing of both the shaping of constitutional values and Supreme Court 
decisionmaking. 
MORE USEFUL. The practice of constitutional law must take into account 
that constitutional decisionmaking is the province of the elected branches as 
well as the judiciary. Therefore, good attorneys must be able to advance 
their interests in both sectors. Sometimes the courts will prove most 
responsive to a constitutional claim, but on many occasions constitutional 
claims are more effectively advanced outside of court. A~ a result, consti-
tutional advocacy cannot be limited to arguments grounded in-often 
unhelpful-Supreme Court decisions. Rather, an advocate must also be 
prepared to advance claims before legislative committees and administra-
tive agencies. Moreover, even in court, especially the Supreme Court, an 
advocate must be prepared to advance arguments rooted in policy as well as 
precedent. 
The pivotal role played by nonjudicial actors is especially apparent 
today. The rulings of the Rehnquist Court increasingly defer to elected 
government decisions. Federal agency interpretations of often vague 
statutory language are likely to be upheld because substantial deference is 
accorded to the interpretation of the authorizing statute by the agency 
authorized with administering it.28 State action is also subject to less 
stringent inquiry, for the Court now appears unwilling to strike down "a 
neutral, generally applicable regulatory law" irrespective of its effects on 
individual rights.29 Indeed, for many interest groups, the focus of consti-
tutional advocacy has shifted from the courts to the executive branch and 
legislature. The National Abortion Rights Action League recently informed 
its membership that "[c]learly Congress is our Court of Last Resort. All 
hope of protecting our constitutional right to choose depends upon our 
elected representatives in Congress responding to the will of the American 
people."30 
Effective constitutional advocacy therefore encompasses familiarity 
with the manner in which elected government resolves constitutional 
disputes and an awareness of how to help government officials equate good 
constitutional decisionmaking with sound public policy. Exposure to em-
pirical study, policy analysis, and editorial commentary, in addition to 
arguments rooted in constitutional theory and history, can be helpful. 
While the Court may defer to the military's judgment to exclude women 
from combat, empirical evidence on the changing nature of warfare may 
well convince Congress to nullify such restrictions.31 Likewise, the Supreme 
Court is unlikely to expand the list of suspect classes to include sexual 
orientation, but studies suggesting that the brain dictates sexuality may well 
28. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984). 
29. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513,2518 (1991) (speech); Employment Div., 
Dep't of Hum. Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990) (religion). 
30. NARAL, Supreme Court Alert (June 27, 1991), quoted in Fisher & Devins, supra note 
4, at 7. 
31. Fisher & Devins, supra note 4, at 283-302. 
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prompt the adoption of antidiscrimination measures.32 The channeling of 
such empirical evidence into effective arguments is often bolstered by 
reading policy analyses and editorial commentary. By marshalling facts, 
history, and values to advance a policy argument, these materials often 
exemplify the kinds of advocacy that constitutional lawyers will engage in 
before legislative and administrative officials.33 
Nonlegal materials play a large role in constitutional decisionmaking. 
Constitutional law texts, by discounting the importance of such materials, 
send the wrong message. To become successful constitutional advocates, 
law students need to recognize the importance of nonjudicial forces in the 
shaping of constitutional values. The inclusion of constitutional politics, 
empirical studies, policy analyses, and editorial commentary in casebooks 
will contribute to that recognition. 
MORE INTERESTING. The constitutional law class is significantly enliv-
ened by the in~roduction of nonjudicial materials. These materials serve as 
a tangible benchmark against which Supreme Court decisions can be 
understood. Students will be better equipped to debate what should 
constitute a suspect class when they are familiar with a range of materials on 
the causes and consequences of homosexuality. Likewise, Marbury seems far 
less mysterious when viewed as a work of political strategy. Further, the 
inclusion of nonjudicial materials reassures students who have never 
studied government in college by providing all students in the class with a 
common base of information. Students are less likely to be intimidated by 
the Supreme Court, their classmates, or their professor when they are all on 
equal footing. Finally, when played against the backdrop of politics, 
empirical study, policy analysis, and editorial commentary, the constitu-
tional law class becomes more vital and more urgent. Departinent of 
Defense guidelines governing press coverage of the Persian Gulf War and 
the related commentary of affected journalists improves class discussion on 
prior restraints. Similarly, the battle between the FCC and Congress over 
diversity preferences helps focus classroom discussion on the costs and 
benefits of affirmative action.s4 
*** 
The inclusion of substantive nonjudicial materials makes the constitu-
tionallaw class more accurate, more useful, and more interesting. Yet, as 
Baker and Viator correctly observe, constitutional law texts limit themselves 
to Supreme Court decisions, academic commentary, author notes and 
32. See, e.g., Curt Suplee, Brain May Dictate Sexuality; Node Seen as Key to Gay 
Orientation, Wash. Post, Aug. 30, 1991, at Al. 
33. Paul Brest attaches a more noble label to this process, namely, "constitutional 
citizenship." Paul Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 Clev. St. L. Rev. 175 (1986). For Brest, 
"If the classical idea of citizenship has any bearing on constitutional decisionmaking in our 
own time, it must be through a political discourse that recognizes the diversity of interests of 
a heterogeneous society and the inevitability of representative government." Id. at 192. 
34. Fisher & Devins, supra note 4, at 283-302. 
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questions, and little else. Until casebook authors shake their belief that 
Supreme Court cases are the stuff of the constitutional law class, the current 
scheme will persist. 
This Correspondence suggests that it is time to change the constitu-
tional law course. To accomplish such change, casebooks will have to forego 
some edited decisions in order to provide a more complete view of how 
constitutional decisionmaking develops.35 Yet, at the same time, Supreme 
Court decisions should remain the centerpiece of the constitutional law 
course. Students do need to learn constitutional doctrine and most of this 
doctrine comes from the Supreme Court. Students also need to understand 
the importance of precedent-based constitutional advocacy. 
Cases are not enough, however. Constitutional decisionmaking often 
extends beyond the court room to legislative committees and administrative 
. agencies. Constitutional litigation, moreover, often hinges on policy argu-
ments. The tradeoff of case materials for nonjudicial materials is therefore 
appropriate; it will reflect the shaping of constitutional values more 
accurately than a Court-centered approach. That it is also more useful and 
more interesting should make this tradeoff irresistible. 
35. Doug Laycock, criticizing the inefficiency of the case method in law school instruction, 
has effectively argued that casebook editors should replace some case material with expository 
text in order to make way for substantial excerpts from nonlegal sources. Douglas Laycock, 
Reflections on Two Themes: Teaching Religious Liberty and Evolutionary Changes in 
Casebooks, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1642, 1652-54 (1988). Admittedly, the choice of which cases to 
cut and which nonjudicial sources to add is extraordinarily difficult. But the critical importance 
of nonjudicial materials to the constitutional law course suggests that casebook editors at least 
try to innovate their texts. 
